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Abstract
We study an economy with competitive commodity markets and ex-
clusive pairwise contractual relations with moral hazard, where both the
principal and the agent can be risk averse. We show existence of equilibria
and their generic constrained suboptimality, by means of a change in the
compensation schemes. Such suboptimality occurs provided the number of
commodities is su¢ciently large relative to the number of states and pair
types, and there are at least three future states of the world.
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Keywords: general equilibrium, moral hazard, constrained suboptimal-
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In this paper we embed the principal-agent model into the Arrow-Debreu frame-
work of uncertainty and perfect competition, and show existence of equilibria.
While previous attempts, for instance Prescott and Townsend (1984) and Ben-
nardo (1996), consider contractual pairs in which risk-neutral principals design the
contract but have no bargaining power, we study principal-agent pairs in which
the principal has all the bargaining power, following the partial equilibrium tra-
dition (see Grossman and Hart (1983), e.g.). Our assumption can be justi…ed for
example if, when contractual pairs are formed, it is too costly for the agents to
switch to another principal if the contract conditions are judged to be unfavorable.
In fact, it can be considered that in our economies contractual pairs are …xed from
the beginning, and we study the e¤ects of their interaction through competitive
commodity markets. The case analyzed in the literature is polar opposite to ours,
assuming that competition across principals leaves them with no surplus, i.e., zero
expected pro…ts. While their assumption translates into a zero expected pro…t
condition for the principals, in our model principals o¤er utility-maximizing con-
tracts, and both the principal and the agent can be risk averse: if the principal
acts in her own interest (as an individually-owned …rm), the assumption of risk
neutrality is clearly restrictive in the space of preferences. As a consequence of
our modeling strategy, the incentive and participation conditions must be directly
incorporated into the principal maximization problem, and nonconvexities arise.
We overcome these di¢culties in a way that does not prevent the use of smooth
analysis for the assessment of the welfare properties of equilibria, essentially ex-
tending the approach of Grossman and Hart (1983) to the general equilibrium
setting. It should be noted that risk neutrality of the principal together with
the zero pro…t condition substantially simpli…es the existence problem, in essence
reducing the search for competitive equilibria when some states are unobservable
to appending some conditions to the usual incomplete markets equilibrium, and
therefore totally bypasses the nonconvexity problems which arise instead in our
framework.
As in the relevant literature, our economy exhibits a …nite number of types of
contractual pairs, but in…nitely many ex ante identical individuals for each type.
However, in each pair optimal contracts are deterministic, and there is no con-
sumption randomization. The bilateral contract concerns sharing an uncertain
output, and this uncertainty is idiosyncratic to the contractual pair; that is, out-
put generates individual risk. To focus on the agency problem, we assume no risk
2in the aggregate. This assumption is totally innocuous, as it will be seen, and it
is made only to simplify the exposition: provided the additional aggregate risk is
independent from individual e¤ort, it could be added to our economy. Although
our model encompasses several examples of contractual relations under incom-
plete information (insurer-insuree, security designer-trader, lender-investor), we
will focus on the traditional case of …rms and workers, paired in independent pro-
duction units. Output is then exchanged on the commodity markets, which are
competitive in the sense that individuals take commodity prices as given. The
price taking behavior depends on the assumption of atomistic individuals, whose
strategic choice of e¤ort does not a¤ect aggregate statistics such as prices.
In our model, principals do not trade linear …nancial contracts. Introducing
asset (insurance) markets would generate the same existence problems …rst high-
lighted by Helpman and La¤ont (1975). Linear (and nonexclusive) contracts of
this form are compatible with competitive equilibrium if asset trading constraints
are imposed, as shown by Bisin and Gottardi (1999). Whether …nancial contracts
are nonlinear or with trading constraints, the bottom line is that with moral
hazard, asset markets will be incomplete. Hence we can expect the welfare conse-
quences of the presence of asymmetric information to be complicated by the price
e¤ects in a model with multiple commodities and incomplete …nancial markets.
We carry out the study of the welfare properties of our competitive equilibria
under the assumption of no …nancial markets.
We study the welfare e¤ects caused by changes in the principal’s direct deci-
sion variable (e.g.: the compensation scheme, the insurance coverage, the asset
payo¤s), while leaving endowments …xed. In other words, we examine the welfare
consequences directly attributable to the contractual imperfections. We show
that the conclusions derived in a partial equilibrium framework, or with a sin-
gle commodity (i.e. constrained optimality, see Prescott and Townsend (1984)),
can be reversed with multiple goods and individuals’ risk aversion, provided the
price e¤ects are predominant (that is, when the number of commodities and of
states is su¢ciently large). The intuition behind the result is all contained in the
price e¤ects that arise with incomplete …nancial markets when there are multiple
commodities (see Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) and, for an extension
of their results, Citanna, Kajii and Villanacci (1998)). In a competitive econ-
omy, the principal designs a contract without taking into account the equilibrium
repercussions on prices. Hence there is room to gain e¢ciency by changing the
compensation scheme. However, and as a di¤erence with Geanakoplos and Pole-
marchakis, in our case constrained suboptimality arises even if traders are not
3able to transfer resources in any future state of the world, but only if the number
of commodities is su¢ciently large and if there are at least three future states
of the world. This last condition is derived from counting the di¤erence between
controls (the compensation schemes) and objectives (the principals’ and agents’
utilities), once the further implicit incentive and rationality constraints are taken
into account. Details are provided in Section 5. Our suboptimality result con-
…rms previous …ndings of Bennardo (1996)1 in the economies with zero-pro…t for
the principals. While the intuition is common to both results (that is, price ef-
fects with multiple commodities are not taken into account by the principals), it
should be noted that our notion of suboptimality cannot be applied in his zero-
pro…t, risk-neutral scenario. That is, with zero-pro…t and risk neutral principals
the suboptimality of equilibrium has to go through an ad hoc construction: the
planner uses endowment redistributions with an additional sector immune from
moral hazard and made up of risk averse individuals. Our intervention plan is
more intuitive because based on the direct pegging of the contractual scheme.
2. Set-up of the model
There are H types of production units denoted by subscript h and a continuum of
units for each type of Lebesgue measure normalized to one.2 A production unit is
a pair of a principal-…rm and an agent-worker. There are C physical commodities,
with C > 1; and the commodity space is RC
++:




++ results; where sh = 1;:::;Sh < 1: In what follows, for simplicity of
notation we will write y
sh
h = ysh; all h. Let S = £H
h=1Sh. Production output is a
publicly observable outcome3.
Each worker can put in the production an unobservable e¤ort ah 2 Ah (a …nite
set of cardinality K), which in‡uences the probability of di¤erent outcomes: ¼
shk
h
is the probability of output ysh if e¤ort ak
h is chosen by the worker. Worker h is
endowed with one indivisible unit of labor, which can only be sold to …rm h or
consumed at home, obtaining a (reservation) utility level Vh 2 R.
1Lisboa (1996) also analyzes a general equilibrium model with moral hazard in production
along the lines of Bennardo, and shows suboptimality through endowment reallocations in equi-
libria when low e¤ort is provided.
2Alternatively, one could think of our economies as the limit of …nite economies as the number
of individuals in each group tends to in…nity. See comments below.
3For simplicity of interpretation, the reader may assume that sh ¸ s0
h implies ysh ¸ ys0
h:





such that if the individual state sh is observed the wage w
sh
h is paid. We assume
that wages are o¤ered as baskets of commodities, instead of being expressed in
nominal terms. As it is customary with the principal-agent literature, the labor
market is modeled as a take-it-or-leave-it exchange of one unit of labor.
We are going to model output uncertainty at the …rm level as individual risk,
and no uncertainty will be derived at the aggregate level. This is accomplished as
follows. All units of each type are assumed to be di¤erent only with respect to the
output realization and the chosen level of e¤ort. Hence they are ex ante identical.
Therefore, aggregate states (as functions from [0;1]
H into S) are equivalent if they
correspond to the same frequencies of output levels for each type (an argument
similar to Malinvaud’s (1973))
Once we …x the proportion of units of type h who choose e¤ort level k, denoted
by µ
k
h, the frequency of output level sh, f
sh













h is the frequency of output level sh given e¤ort level ak




h is alsothe frequencyf
shk
h as aconsequence
of the presence of a continuum of individuals for each type and of the Law of
Large Numbers (see Uhlig (1996)). Therefore f
shk




h will be determined in equilibrium, individuals take it as given,
as they do with future spot commodity prices. This entails a stronger notion
of rational expectations. Therefore, from the individual viewpoint the frequency
f
sh
h is also given and unique. This is equivalent to the absence of aggregate
risk in this economy. Although independent aggregate risk could be added to
the speci…cation of uncertainty faced by individuals, this would only complicate
the notation without adding anything substantial to the analysis. Hence we will
assume no further independent aggregate risk in the economy.
4Note also that using a continuum of agents in each group guarantees consistency of price-
taking behavior on the commodity markets, but does not yield proper market clearing conditions,
e¤ective at every realization of uncertainty, but only on (L2¡) average. The interpretation à la
Malinvaud based on limit economies would result in e¤ective market clearing, since in that case
we could use Kolmogorov’s Strong Law of Large Numbers. However, in either way any large
but …nite economy would only have approximate market clearing, so we use the continuum of
agents to make our model similar to others used in the literature.




However, in what follows we will sometimes keep the use of K to denote the
number of e¤orts, and this to help the reader identify where the dimensionality of
vectors comes from. De…ne A ´ £H





V . Firm h is endowed with a sure vector of goods eh 2 RC
+ and an uncertain















k=1 : Moreover, for h = 1;:::;H, denote
by x
shc
ih 2 R++ the consumption in individual state sh of good c by …rm h (when








ih)sh = xih; for
i = f;w and (xfh;xwh)
H




We introduce the basic assumptions of the model. First, we impose standard
restrictions on probabilities, that is, …rst order stochastic dominance of the high-
level e¤ort over the low-level.
Assumption 1 (stochastic dominance) For any k = 1;2; ¼k
h belongs to the






s=1 ¼s = 1
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and ¼h 2













for all s 2 Sh; with strict inequality for some s.
Let ¦h be the set of such vectors ¼h: De…ne ¦ = £H
h=1¦h. We then assume that
…rms and workers’ utility functions are constant across all output realizations, and
satisfy standard smooth assumptions.
Assumption 2 (risk-averse principal)5 The utility function for …rm h is Uh :
Ah £ R
ShC
++ ! R; where
5With only minor changes in the model (namely, allowing for RC
+ as the consumption space
and assuming simple di¤erential concavity of the utility functions, de…ned without the boundary
condition and dropping the unboundedness-from-below assumption) we could accomodate for
risk neutrality and still show existence. The test economy that we selected is still valid. Since
the extension is trivial and only makes the notation cumbersome, we prefer to concentrate on
the case of strict convexity, i.e., of risk aversion for both the principal and the agent. However,





















and where uh : RC
++ ! R is C2, di¤erentially strictly increasing, di¤erentially
strictly concave, with closure of indi¤erence surfaces contained in RC
++. In
addition, limx!0 uh(x) = ¡1:
Call Uh the set of the above de…ned utility functions uh and also U = £h Uh.
Endow it with the C2 compact-open topology.
Assumption 3 (risk-averse agent) The utility function for worker h is Vh : Ah£
R
ShC



















and where vh : RC
++ ! R has the same properties as uh.
Call Vh the set of the above de…ned utility functions vh and also V = £h Vh.
Following the partial equilibrium literature, we assume absence of risk sharing
opportunities other than the bilateral contract.
Assumption 4 (no assets) There are no …nancial instruments.6
The compensation scheme is real, in the sense of specifying the right to a
proportion of the commodity bundle owned by the …rm. It is based on veri…able
information (the output states), and we require that it satisfy limited liability.
Assumption 5 (limited liability) The wage o¤ered by each …rm is a proportion





h p(eh + y
sh)
with 0 · !
sh
h · 1; all sh:
6This assumption means absence of linear …nancial contracts, and it is not in contrast with the
insurance interpretation of the main contract. It could be disposed of in a model where bounds
are imposed on asset trading (see Bisin and Gottardi (1999)), and where only principals trade
assets. Of course, additional nonlinear contracts could easily be added to the main contractual
relation.
7The timing of the model is simple. First, each pair h of …rm and worker ex-
change a contract (wh;ah). Then the worker chooses a level of e¤ort ah; production
takes place and an individual state sh for each individual arises. Owners of …rms
and workers go to the market with their share of production and/or endowments
and exchange them at the prevailing price.
The objective of each worker is to choose an e¤ort, and then buy goods in
order to maximize his utility. The objective of each …rm is to choose a contract
and the e¤ort to be given by the worker, and then buy goods in order to maximize
its utility.












h p(eh + ysh) ¸ 0 for all sh
(2.1)










fh + (1 ¡ !
sh
h )p(ysh + eh) ¸ 0 ; for all sh,
(2) 0 · !
sh

















¡ V h ¸ 0:
(2.2)
for given p;y;eh: Constraints (3) and (4) are the incentive and participation con-
straint, respectively. Observe that at this stage the problem of the worker is solved
also by the …rm.
We need to make the individual e¤ort choice consistent with the de…nition of
µ
k
h: First, let µh = (µ
k
h)K
k=1 and let µ = (µh)H
h=1. Since µ
k
h represents the proportion
of individuals choosing e¤ort k, and it is an endogenous quantity, an equilibrium
must require that µ
k
h be equal to one (zero) if the corresponding e¤ort dominates
(is dominated by) the other at given prices, and that µ
k
h be in between only if
both e¤orts are utility maximizers for each …rm in unit h.














8subject to the constraint in problem 2.1 where choice variables are indexed by k;
for given p;yh;eh and !k















subject to the constraints (2.2.1) through (2.2.4) with choice variables again
indexed by k and for given p;yh;eh; where the superscript k denotes the choice
conditional on the e¤ort level k = 1;2: This is coherent with the standard natural
way of solving problem 2.2, that is (i) to solve it with respect to (!h;xfh) for …xed
ak







which gives the highest value of the
objective function. Note that the principal o¤ers only one contract, contingent
on the observable state sh, and that the solution technique does not correspond




























Because of homogeneity of degree zero of the budget constraints, we can normalize
prices setting the price of the last good equal to one. An economy will be identi…ed
by an n-tuple





++ £ A £ ¦ £ U £ V £ R
H
of endowments, outputs, e¤ort levels, probabilities, utilities and reservation levels.






h Sh)K £RHK £R
C¡1
++ is an equi-
librium associated to the economy (e;y;a;¼;u;v;V ) if and only if


































h = 1(= 0)
and 0 · µ
2




h = 1; for all h.
9Before proving existence, we need to add assumptions that make the economic
problem interesting, by ruling out the case of empty constraint sets. In particular,
we want to make sure that the agent can be asked to participate. Given that we
are using a di¤erentiable approach to existence, we will make assumptions to
further require that this can be done by staying in the interior of the constraint
set. This is so accomplished.
Assumption 6 For any h, let ¡h ½ RC
+ £R
CSh
++ £Ah£¦h £Vh £R be the set of
°h ´ (eh;y;ah;¼h;vh;V h) such that
vh (y











h + V h;a
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Assumption 6 in essence says that in any state sh the agent’s utility can be
set high enough with the given resources of the …rm, yet without fully utilizing
them.
We will use ¡ = £h¡h and U as our parameter spaces. De…ne it as - = ¡£U.
In order to apply degree theory, we will need the following property for the set
¡h:
Lemma 2.2. ¡h is nonempty and path-connected, all h:
This lemma is technical, although straightforward, and its proof notationally
cumbersome, hence it is omitted and is available from the authors upon request.
An immediate consequence of Lemma 2.2 is the following result.
Corollary 2.3. - is nonempty and path-connected.
Proof. U is path-connected (see Smale (1974)). Path-connectedness of ¡ follows
from Lemma 2.2. Nonemptiness also is either trivial or follows from the same
lemma.
We move now to the analysis of the maximization problems in greater detail.
103. The two maximization problems
It is pretty straightforward to see that problems 2.1 and 2.2 can be solved using
the method …rst suggested by Grossman and Hart (1983). Consider the problem,










h p(ysh + eh) ¸ 0:
(3.1)
De…ne the smooth value function to the above problem as e vh (!
sh







solves 2.1 if and only if x
sh¤















Also from basic consumer theory we know that, for any (!
sh
h ;p;ysh;eh), D!she vh >
0 and D2
!she vh < 0: Fix a vector y. Because of strict monotonicity of e vh; for
any given p the restriction of e vh (!
sh
h ;p;ysh;eh) at this commodity price vector
admits (smooth) inverse, say Áh (:;p;ysh;eh): De…ne z
sh





h ;p;ysh;eh) = !
sh
h . Since D!she vh > 0 and D2
!she vh < 0, then DzshÁh =
1




D!she vh > 0: Here we are heavily exploiting both
utility state separability and the exclusive nature of the contract.





is a solution to prob-
lems 2.1 and 2.2 i¤ for any sh; x
sh

















h ¢ e vh (!
sh





h ¢ e vh (!
sh
h ;p;ysh;eh) ¡ ak0
h ; all k;k0 2 K
(4)
P
sh ¼shk ¢ e vh (!
sh
h ;p;ysh;eh) ¡ ak
h ¡ V h ¸ 0:
(3.2)
for given p;y;eh and ~ vh: Observe that (3) implies that the …rm’s choice of ah is
the one carried out by the worker.
After substituting everywhere Áh (z
sh
h ;p;ysh;eh) for !
sh
h in (1) through (4); and
after splitting problem 3.2 according to what previously done in Section 2, we can




















p(eh + ysh) ¸ 0:
(3.3)
11for a given p;y;eh and zk




















p(eh + ysh) ¸ 0 for any sh,





























h ¡ V h ¸ 0
(3.4)
for given p;y;eh and Áh: Let Bh(p;eh;y;Áh;ak
h) be …rm h’s constraint set given
that ak
h is the chosen e¤ort, for k = 1;2; that is constraints (1) through (4); given
ak
h: We consider for given ak















A …rst intermediate step in proving our existence theorem is to show that Bh(:)
has a nonempty interior, for all k: This is established in the following lemma,
which heavily relies upon Assumption 6.
Lemma 3.1. Underthe maintainedassumptions, Bh(p;eh;y;Áh;ak
h) has anonempty
interior, for all k:
Proof. See the Appendix.
A consequence of Lemma 3.1 is that for any p;ysh;eh;Áh;ak






h) such that xk
fh À 0 (with corresponding !shk 2






to 3.5 exists, it must be the case




















: This condition will be used to discard con-
straint (2) in problem 3.5, and later in proving Lemma 4.4 (indeed, it amounts to
a useful device to compactify problem 3.5).
Given our assumptions, if a solution to the programming problem 3.4 exists, it
is unique, and for each k; the same is true for problem 3.5. Given Lemma 3.1, the
only hurdle to using the Kuhn-Tucker conditions to characterize these solutions
is constraint (2); which we now eliminate.
Lemma 3.2. For any admissible p;y;eh; (x;z) is a solution to problem 3.5 only
if 0 < Á(z
sh
h ;p;ysh;eh) < 1; for any sh:
12Proof. See the Appendix.
Problem 3.5 satis…es both necessary and su¢cient conditions to apply Kuhn-
Tucker Theorem (see Mangasarian (1969), e.g.): all constraints and the objective
function are pseudoconcave and the constraint set has nonempty interior from
Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2.
We conclude this section establishing regularity of the solution to problem 3.5,
all k.
Lemma 3.3. The solution to problem 3.5 is a smooth function of the parameters,
outside borderline cases.
Proof. See the Appendix.
4. Existence of an equilibrium
We want to show existence of an equilibrium by using the associated system of
Kuhn-Tucker and market clearing equations. For ease of notation, we set
f
shk





































h ¡ V h
g
shk





















h ¸ 0 the multiplier associated with fk
2h, and …nally ´
h and ´h the multipliers
associated with the constraints µ
2
h ¸ 0 and 1¡µ
2
h ¸ 0; respectively. As we observed
in the proof of Lemma 3.3, both ®
shk
h > 0 and f
shk
1h = 0; and ¯
k
h > 0 and fk
3h = 0;
all sh;k;h. Also, let ½
shk
h be the multiplier associated with the constraint g
shk
h in
3.3, again with ½
shk
h > 0 and g
shk
h = 0. Using the …rst order conditions for the two















































= 0; all h (5)
f
shk








= 0; all k;h (7)
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h p = 0; all sh;k;h (9)
g
shk






























] = 0 (11)
(4.1)
Observe that in (4.1) we have deleted the last market clearing equation, corre-
sponding to the numeraire commodity C; using Walras law. In order to …nd
a solution to system (4:1) we apply a degree theorem (see Lloyd (1978)). Let
F°;u : ¥ ! Rº; with º = dim¥; be the function de…ning the equations in system
(4:1): Here ¥ is the space of “endogenous” variables, which is a product of open
spaces, or manifolds without boundaries. Note that we have actually parametrized
a family of such functions, and by Corollary 2.3 we can build a continuous homo-
topy H : ¥ £ [0;1] ! Rº between any two such functions, that is between any
two economies (°;u);(°0;u0) 2 -: In order for deg2 F°;u to be well de…ned at the
value zero for these functions, we prove that the set H¡1(0) is compact. We then
can construct a test economy (°¤;u¤) for the case of Sh = S = 2 for all h, with
a unique equilibrium (x;z;µ;p); and show that the test economy is regular, that
is, F°¤;u¤ is continuously di¤erentiable at least locally around the unique point »
such that F°¤;u¤(») = 0; and with full-ranked derivative D»F°¤;u¤: The application
of the degree theorem is completed after constructing another homotopy between
the function de…ning the equilibrium for an economy with an arbitrary (…nite)
number of states and a related economy with two states.
These facts will lead to the key statement of the paper.
Theorem 4.1. For any economy (°;u) 2 -; an equilibrium exists.
The proof follows from the four subsequent lemmas, which establish the prop-
erties we just summarized.
14We build the test economy. Although the test economy is simpli…ed and is
based on the assumption that Sh = S = 2; it captures the fundamental elements of
the model and will be used to extend the existence result to any …nite Sh (Lemma
4.5). Assuming S = 2 allows us to easily show regularity, especially regarding the
incentive and participation constraint equations (see Lemma 4.3).
Lemma 4.2. There exists an economy (°¤;u¤) with a unique associated equilib-
rium »
¤ = (x;z;µ;p):
Proof. Recall that °h = (eh;y;ah;¼h;vh;V h): Assume without loss of generality




c=1 logxc. Also, take eh = eh ¢1; with eh > 0; as the endowments, and for all
h and all s take ys
h = e y
s ¢ 1; with e y
s > 0: De…ne ys = e y
s + eh. Choose eh and ~ ys
such that ys = 100 and y~ s = 1000, for the states s and ~ s. Take
a
1
h = log1 = 0; and a
2
h = loge = 1:











Finally, set V h = log1 = 0, for all h.
Now we show that there is a unique equilibrium for the above-chosen economy
(°;u): Consider the associated standard exchange economy with individuals hav-
ing initial allocation ys
h + eh; all s. Under the assumed separability of the utility














h ¡ eh) = 0
Let ¹s







































)h; p = 1] is a no-trade walrasian equilibrium, therefore
it is the unique equilibrium associated to the (full information) Pareto optimal
allocation (ys
h + eh)s;h. In other words, any initial allocation which is equal across
commodities for each household is a Pareto optimal allocation with associated
unique equilibrium price equal to 1. Hence, in these economies any sharing of the
















and let p = 1: Once !sk
h is given and unique, the uniqueness of equilibrium prices
and allocations follows from a standard argument: there cannot be an equilibrium
vector of consumption other than the one just computed because, due to the strict
concavity of the utility function, this other vector of consumption would violate
Pareto optimality; but if that is the case, then prices and multipliers are unique,
too.
Once !sk
h is given; it is immediately shown that equations (4.1.6) and (4.1.10)
are satis…ed. If also µ
2
h = 1; as we will show, equation (4.1.11) is automatically





h ys; even equation (4.1.9) is satis…ed, mirroring
the …rst order condition in the walrasian equilibrium for each state s; and for each








Observe that we can uniquely determine zsk
h = log!sk
h ys:
We are therefore left with checking existence and uniqueness of !sk
h ; for all s;k
and h; satisfying system (4:1); and in particular the remaining equations (4.1.2)
through (4.1.5), and equations (4.1.7) and (4.1.8), and with showing that µ
2
h = 1;
all h: Note that this entails determining uniquely also the remaining variables ¯;±






























































for k = 1;2 and with k0 6= k. Therefore, dropped the subscript h, the main






!sk 2 (0;1) all s;k; to the system of equations: (4.4), for all s;k; and (4:1:7),
(4:1:8).
If, as we will show, U1
h < U2
h; then, from (4.1.3) we get ´
h¡´h < 0; from (4.1.4)
it follows that ´h > ´
h ¸ 0 , and, …nally, from (4.1.5), we get that µ
2
h = 1, all h,
as desired. Now from equation (4.1.4), the only solution will be ´h = 0: Equation
(4.1.3) is then an equation in one unknown, ´h; clearly with a unique solution,
di¤erent from zero. A sketch of the computations is provided in the Appendix.
Di¤erentiability and full rank of the derivative with respect to the endogenous
variables now follow from the observation that the derivative of our system is
essentially equivalent, after a change of basis, to the derivative of a standard
incomplete markets economy, with no …nancial markets.
Lemma 4.3. (°¤;u¤) is a regular economy.
Proof. See the Appendix.
It is maintained that Sh ¸ 2 for all h.
Lemma 4.4. The set H¡1 (0) is compact.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Finally, here is the result that links economies with Sh = 2 to any …nite Sh;
all h:
Lemma 4.5. There is a continuous homotopy · from economies with Sh = 2
and economies with Sh > 2 (and …nite), all h: The set ·¡1(0) is compact, and the
economy (°¤;u¤) is still a regular test economy.
Proof. See the Appendix.
175. Constrained suboptimality
In this section we establish the generic constrained suboptimality of the equilib-
rium allocations. In particular, we consider a central authority who could choose
z
shk
h (which is tantamount to choosing !
shk
h ) in lieu of the principals.7 Let z
shk
h
be the control variables, and z 2 RKSH the corresponding vector. With a slight
modi…cation from Citanna, Kajii and Villanacci (1998), the possibility of Pareto









cTc ¡ 1 = 0
(5.1)
where: a) ~ F(~ »;z;z;¯;°;u) = 0 represents system (4.1) without equations (2) and
(8); with ~ » = »n(z;¯); while z is kept at the equilibrium level, that is, z solves




























c) the derivatives are taken with respect to ~ » and z, and; d) c is a vector of real
coe¢cients. For z = 0; ~ F(~ »;z;z;¯;°;u) = 0 and equation (4.1.2) and (4.1.8)
are equivalent to F(»;°;u) = 0: If we kept the participation constraint, overall
the agent would not be a¤ected by the change in z. This way we could only
care to show that the principals can be made better o¤. However, we drop the
participation constraint and make sure that the agents, as well as the principals,
can be made better o¤.
Evidently, system (5.1) is well de…ned if ~ F is di¤erentiable, at least locally
around an equilibrium, which is true if there are no corner solutions at the mini-
mum functions in (4.1). We will …rst assume that to be the case, and show that
this restriction is weakly generic in the space of parameters. As usual, a property
is weakly generic if it holds in an open and dense subset of the parameter space.
7It is clear that the methodology applies to a wider range of interventions on the equilibrium
outcome. For instance, it is easier to establish that endowment reallocations through taxes and
transfers would also lead to a Pareto improvement over the equilibrium outcome.
18Given Theorem 4.1, system (5.1) has no solution if and only if the last two









h + c12h~ µ
k
hDUk
h = 0 (1)
¡ck
1hªT = 0 (2)
ck
7hÂ[±k







h) = 0 (4)
c3h + c4h(1 ¡ Â[µ2
h=0]) = 0 (5)
¡c3h + c5h(1 ¡ Â[µ2




10hª + c11~ µ
k
hXk
h = 0 (7)
¡ck




















h = 0 (10)
cTc ¡ 1 = 0 (11)
(5.2)
where: Â is the indicator function which is one on the set in brackets and zero on





= 1 ¡ µ
2.8 Counting equations and unknowns, note
that there are KSH equations (10) (corresponding to the derivatives with respect
to zh), but that we have added the 3H extra variables (the rows DG) c12h, and
ck
13h; for k = 1;2, all h: Moreover, notice that at any equilibrium where ±
k
h 6= 0;
we also lose equations (3) in (5.2). Hence, throwing away equations (3), we have
KSH ¡KH ¡3H +1 too many equations. This number is positive provided that
S ¸ 3.
We are now ready to state the main result of this section.
Theorem 5.1. For an open and dense subset of -; if S ¸ 3 and C ¡ 1 ¸ KSH;
the equilibrium allocation is constrained suboptimal.




























































19Openness follows from the properness of the natural projection (Lemma 4.4).
To prove density in Theorem 5.1, we will use a standard strategy to show that
(5.1) has no solution, involving a transversality argument based on perturbations
of system (5.1). This usually entails showing regularity of the equilibrium system
…rst, and then applying quadratic perturbations of utility functions to show that
the derivative of (5.2) with respect to c; and the parameters e;u; has full rank.
Instead, mainly for compactness of exposition, we will establish the full rank
property directly in one step, and then will make use of a transversality argument
for in…nite dimensional spaces to conclude that also the derivative of system (5.1)
with respect to c and the endogenous variables would be full generically, but
the resulting manifold with negative dimension is then empty. Hence the …rst
step toward proving genericity of constrained suboptimality is to construct the
perturbation technology for the in…nite dimensional case.
5.1. The perturbation technology
We parametrize utilities in the following way. For any given economy (°;u), we
…x y and e, and the components of ° other than utilities, call them °0, with




h + eh in its interior; all sh and all h; and therefore bounded away from the
axes of RC
++: Then the space U (and V) of utilities previously de…ned and now
restricted to such a compact set is a Banach space for a bounded metric induced
by the C2 compact-open topology.9 Then -°0 is also a Banach space. If a property
is dense with respect to the set -°0, then it is also dense with respect to -: This is
because density is essentially a local property, and we can imagine the functions
in -°0 to be extended to the original domain in the following way. If an economy
does not satisfy the property, we wiggle the utilities de…ned over the compact set
previously constructed, and keep them unchanged outside an open set containing
this compact set. Clearly, if two functions are close in the topology on -°0 then
they are close in -; given our construction and the metric on -°0. Given this,
from now on we drop the reference to the point °0 and simply write - for -°0.
Given our economy (°;u) and a corresponding function uh 2 Uh; we consider



























9This is true because U (and V) are G± subsets of the space of C2 functions (for a proof, see
Allen (1981), e.g.), and G± subsets are topologically complete (see Hocking and Young (1961)).
20as a perturbed utility function, with ·
s;k
fh 2 R, a
s;k
fh 2 RC and A
s;k
fh a C £ C







to be small in norm, so that d(uh;uh) < "; for a given " > 0; and where d(:) is the
distance induced by the C2 sup norm in Uh: With this formulation, the set of all
uh so obtained is a linear subspace of Uh. Similar conclusions hold for Vh. That
is so provided we are able to perturb utilities without transforming them from
state-independent to state-dependent. This can be accomplished in steps. First,





ih ; when either s 6= s0 or k 6= k0, all i = f;w and all h: This allows
perturbations of utilities in the form expressed above without altering their state-





ih ; some s;s0;k;k0;i and h; with s 6= s0 or k 6= k0 is meager. An iterative




ih ; all s;s0;k;k0;i and h is
also nongeneric. This is in essence the analogue of dealing with corner solutions.
Since the left hand side of (5.1) is a function © from a Banach space into
Rº (with º < 1), it su¢ces to show that D»;c;°00©(»;c;°00), computed at all
values such that ©(»;c;°00) = 0, is onto when restricted to the particular linear
subspace of U (and V) identi…ed by the above parametrization. Note that this
subspace is …nite for given x¤; but not necessarily so as we move x¤; since we
do not know at this point that the number of equilibria is …nite. The need to
use the in…nite dimensional version of the transversality theorem arises from the
(uncountably) in…nite dimensionality of this subspace, which in turn derives from
the need to independently perturb the utility gradient and Hessian, hence to center
the perturbation around x¤.
Once it is established that rank of the derivative is full, i.e. rank D»;c;°00© = º;
we can apply the Sard-Smale theorem (see Smale (1965) or Abraham et al. (1988),
Theorem. 3.6.15) to establish transversality, that is, we conclude that there is a
dense subset of - such that rank D»;c©°;u(»;c) = º; for all °;u in this subset.
We can apply the theorem since the projection ¼ : ©¡1(0) ! - is a Fredholm
map. It is a continuous linear map, in fact a smooth map, if we establish that rank
D»;c;°00© = D© = º; so that ©¡1(0) is a Banach smooth submanifold of ¥£C£-,
a Lindelöf manifold, and:
a) ¼ is (proper over a Hausdor¤, locally compact and …rst countable topological
space, hence) closed;
b) ¥ £ C is …nite dimensional;
c) ©¡1(0) is a closed subspace of …nite codimension (a consequence of codim
©¡1(0) = dimRº)
21Then the statement on ¼ follows from Abraham et al (1988), Lemma 3.6.24,
and:
d) ¼ has …nite kernel, since dimker¼ = dim[(¥ £ C) \ ©¡1(0)] = º; and,
e) ¼ has …nite co-kernel, a consequence of Abraham et al:, Lemma 3.6.23.
Hence, by the Sard-Smale theorem, the set of regular values of ¼ is open and
dense in -: The transversality proof is then concluded like in the standard …nite
dimensional case.
5.2. Density
We are now ready to prove the second part of Theorem 5.1, the density statement.
Proof. Assume conditions A) through D), that is:
A) csk
1h 6= 0; and csk










fh = 0 (5.3)
in matrix form as Ab = 0;where
A =
2
6 6 6 6 6 6
4
¢¢¢ xsk1
fh ¡ [(1 ¡ Á(zsk
h )]~ ys1 +
@©h
@p1 p1e ys1 ¢¢¢
. . .
¢¢¢ xskc
fh ¡ [(1 ¡ Á(zsk
h )]~ ysc +
@©h




fh ¡ [(1 ¡ Á(zsk
h )]~ ys(C¡1) +
@©h
@p1 pC¡1e ysC¡1 ¢¢¢
3
7 7 7 7 7 7
5
is a (C¡1)£KSH-dimensional matrix of individual excess demands, ~ ys = ys+eh;
and for ease of notation s = sh; while b = (¢¢¢;csk
6h;¢¢¢) is a KSH-dimensional
vector. There exists a square submatrix of A with KSH rows, and full rank,
denoted by A0: This explains why we assume that C ¡ 1 ¸ KSH:











h (xs1n ¡ ysn ¡ e
n
h) 6= 0:




ih ; when either
s 6= s0 or k 6= k0, all i = f;w and all h;
First observe that if A), and after throwing out (H ¡1) of equations (4); and
equation (11), which under our assumptions we do without compromising the
excess number of equations in the system, the following perturbation of system
(5.2) works:
22Afh; all k;h (1)
cskC
1h ; all s;k;h (2)
cc
11; some c (4)
c3h if µ
2
h = 0; c4h otherwise; all h (5)
c3h if µ
2
h = 1; c5h otherwise, all h (6)
Awh; all k;h (7)
cskC
9h ; all s;k;h (8)
c
sknC
9h ; some h;s;k (9)
csk
6h; all s;k;h (10)
(5.4)
Note that (4) is perturbedusing conditionC). The next step is to showthat D»;°00F
has full rank (without using ®s0k0
h0 ), which would imply that rank D»;c;°00© = º: We
can apply the transversality theorem to state that system (5.1) has no solution as
desired, provided the stated conditions hold. This is immediately veri…ed using







































fh ; some s;k;h all c 6= C (11)
(5.5)
Note that equations (11) do not contain the market clearing condition for
c = C.
As for condition A), observe that if ck
1h = 0 and ck
9h = 0, all h;k; then also
ck
10h = 0; and c11 = 0, using the numéraire commodity normalization. Using









Concentrating on equations (5.2.9), one can see that these form the subsystem
(5.3). Under condition B), if C ¡ 1 ¸ KSH; (5.3) has a unique solution, that is,
23c
k
6h = 0 (5.7)










+(¡1)kc3h = 0; all k;h. But this expression implies c3h = c12h = 0;
all h, hence from equations (5.2.4) we have c4h = c5h = 0; while from equations
(10) in (5.2) and using Assumption 1, we get ck
7h = ck
13h = 0: Note that this we
do even in the case when ±
k
h = 0; by using equation (3). This means c = 0; a
contradiction to the equation cTc¡1 = 0; implying that system (5.1) cannot have
a solution in this case:10
If there is an s0;k0;h0 such that cs0k0
1h0 = 0; then equation (5.2.2) drops for s0, and
we can drop C¡1 equations (5.2.1), leaving the numéraire equation, and obtaining
(5.6) for s0;k0;h0. We drop (H ¡ 1)equations of (5.2.4) and equation (5.2.11) as
before. Taking into account condition C), we can perturb the remaining equation
in (5.2.4) using c11; we can use cs0k0
6h0 to perturb (5.6), and use cs0k0
10h0 to perturb
(5.2.10). Then everything else goes through as in the …rst case. If there is an
s0;k0;h0 such that cs0k0
9h0 = 0; but cs0k0
1h0 6= 0, then from (5.2.7) we obtain cs0k0
10h0 = 0;
and we can drop the C equations (5.2.7) and proceed to perturb this subsystem
as before. If cs0k0
























10If C = 1, then system (5.2) reduces to
ck









c3h + c4h(1 ¡ Â[µ2
h=0]) = 0










cTc ¡ 1 = 0
















h0 ¢ c11[1£(C¡1)] [[IC¡1j0]][(C¡1)£C] = 0;
which implies that c11 = 0, if e µ
k0
h0 6= 0; so we gain an extra degree of freedom, and
throw away the one equation among (5.2.4), (5.2.1) and (5.2.7) which we cannot
perturb. If e µ
k0
h0 = 0; we lose the equation we are not able to perturb:
Finally, we show that conditions B), C) and D) hold generically. The argument
is standard and is sketched in the Appendix (see Regularity results). To conclude,
we obtain a dense subset of parameters where system (5.1) has no solution, as we
were to show.
25A. Proof of Lemma 3.1
Drop the subscript h: The set B(p;e;y;Á;ak) could be empty because of con-
straints (3) and (4): Indeed, for any s; once !s is given; if xs
f = (1¡!s)(ys+e)=2
then (1) is satis…ed as a strict inequality. We distinguish the cases when k = 1 or
k = 2: Without loss of generality assume a2 ¸ a1:













by Assumption 6 and by de…nition of indirect utility. By continuity and mono-
tonicity of ~ v, for all s there exists an !s 2 (0;1) such that z > ~ v(!s;p;ys;e) >




: Since ~ v is a di¤eomorphism, for all s there
exists an !s such that z = ~ v(!s;p;ys;e); and !s < 1 by construction and !s > 0
by Assumption 3. So (2) is also satis…ed with strict inequalities. Let zs = z and





1 ¡ V = z ¡ a
1 ¡ V > 0











b) If k = 1 but a2 = a1; let s be a state such that ¼s2 ¡ ¼s1 > 0 and
~ s a state where ¼~ s2 ¡ ¼~ s1 < 0. Such states exist by Assumption 1. Since
lim!!0 e v(!;p;ys;e) = ¡1 and, by Assumption 6, for any s;
v(y
s + e) >
¯ ¯a
2 ¡ a
1¯ ¯ = 0
the continuity of e v and the connectedness of [0;1] imply that for all s there exists
an !s 2 (0;1) such that e v(!s;p;ys;e) = 0: Let !s = !s and zs = e v(!s;p;ys;e) = 0
for all s 6= ~ s: Then (3) and (4) are satis…ed with inequalities. By Assumption




such that the above
inequalities are satis…ed in a strict sense and such that !~ s = Á(z~ s;p;y~ s;e) 2 (0;1);
so that (2) is satis…ed too.
26c) Finally, for k = 2; again for all s there exists an !s 2 (0;1) such that
e v(!s;p;ys;e) = 0: Let zs = 0 and !s = !s for all s 6= s; where s is as above: Using
Assumption 6, again we immediately can choose zs such that both constraints
(3) and (4) are satis…ed with strict inequalities (this is where the full power of
Assumption 6 is used). Then, letting !s = Á(zs;p;ys;e); we have 0 < !s < 1; and
constraint (2) is satis…ed and nonbinding.
B. Proof of Lemma 3.2
>From the participation constraint (4) it must be that !
sh









Hence at an optimum for problem 3.5, the constraint Áh(z
sh
h ;p;ysh;eh) ¸ 0 is
never binding. Similarly, it must be that !
sh
h < 1: We know that the …rm can lock






in each state, as a consequence of Lemma 3.1. Recall that
x
shk
fh is obtained with !
shk















minc pc : (This last statement shows that the
very low utility in state sh can be compensated by a very high utility in the other
states only up to a given extent.). Now assume that there is k and sh such that
!
shk
h ! 1: Then x
shk







fh ) = ¡1:
which ends our proof.
C. Proof of Lemma 3.3.


















































































h ¡ V hg = 0 (5)
(C.1)
One immediately sees that ®
shk
h > 0; all sh;k;h; that ¯
k
h > 0 all k;h: To show
¯
k
h > 0; solve for ®
shk


































h = 0: If ±
k
h > 0, there is a state s such that ¼sk
h ¡ ¼sk0
h < 0, while the
right-hand side is always positive, clearly an absurd. Similarly, with ±
k
h = 0; we




We limit ourselves to showing that if it is not the case that constraint (3) holds
with equality and ±
k
h = 0, then the derivative of system (C.1) with respect to the
choice variables and the multipliers (listed to the left-hand side of the system) has
full row rank. Hereafter, we drop the subscript h and …x a k:
If ±
k > 0 and
P
s(¼sk ¡¼sk0)¢zsk ¡ak +ak0 = 0; taking the derivative, we get




6 6 6 6
4
D2
k 0 ¡ªT 0 0
0 ¡Á
00k ¡Á
0k ¼k ¡ ¼k0 ¼k
¡ª ¡Á
0kT 0 0 0
0 (¼k ¡ ¼k0)T 0 0 0
0 ¼kT 0 0 0
3













28an S £ CS matrix of prices, and D2
k; Á
0k and Á
00k are matrices of dimension
SC£SC (the …rst) and S£S (the last two) with zeros o¤ the diagonal, and with















¢p(ys+e); respectively. Note that Á
00sk > 0; all s;k.
If ±




h > 0; the matrix of derivatives has

















We want to show both that 0 = Mk¢; where ¢ = (¢x;¢z;¢®;¢±;¢¯) implies
that ¢ = 0; and that 0 = Mk0¢0 where ¢0 = (¢x;¢z;¢®;¢¯) implies ¢0 = 0:
The argument is standard, based on the convexity of preferences, and the details
are left to the reader.
D. Proof of Lemma 4.2.
Drop the subscript h: The relevant subsystem composed of equations (4.4) and
(4.1.7) and (4.1.8) is written more compactly as
(1) ¼s1¯




s(¼s1 ¡ ¼s2)log!s1ys ¡ a12 ¸ 0
(3)
P
s ¼s1 log!s1ys = a1
(4) ¼s2¯




s(¼s1 ¡ ¼s2)log!s2ys ¡ a12 · 0
(6)
P
s ¼s2 log!s2ys = a2
(D.1)
where (1) and (4) correspond to equations (4.1.2), (2) and (5) correspond to equa-
tions (4.1.7) and (3) and (6) correspond to equations (4.1.8), once it is understood
that ±
k ¸ 0; for k = 1;2, and that if (2) is a strict inequality, ±
1 = 0; and if (8) is
a strict inequality, ±











ye s = 1=10: Once the parameters are …xed, system (D.1) is formed of two
independent blocks, expressions (1) through (3); and expressions (4) through (6):
Moreover, each block can be solved recursively. The strategy to solve the above
system is decomposed in steps (all equation numbers refer to system (D.1), unless
otherwise stated):
(i) Since (2) cannot hold as equality, and therefore ±
1 = 0, solve for ¯
1;±
1;!s1;
all s, from equations (1) and (3) and verify that (2) is satis…ed.




hence for !s2 and !~ s2 from equations (5) and (6).
(iii) Solve for ¯
2, ±
2 as functions of !s2; for s = s;~ s; from equation (4), checking
that ±
2 > 0.
(iv) Check that the restrictions on !s2 are satis…ed.










, so that µ
2
h = 1; for all h:
The details of the computation are available from the authors upon request.
E. Proof of Lemma 4.3.
The derivative of the extended system F°¤;u¤ (»




6 6 6 6 6 6
4
M10




h 0 0 0
0 0 M2
h 0 0 P2
fh
C1
















h = Mk; the previously de…ned matrix (see Lemma 3.3) of derivatives
of the principal’s …rst order conditions, and similarly, Mk0
h is Mk0 with the added
column of the derivative with respect to ±
k and the row corresponding to equation
(4:1:7) (calculations in Lemma 4.2 show that ±
1
h = 0 while f1





h is a 3£(CSh+2Sh+2) matrix of zeros, except for the …rst CSh elements
of the …rst row, which are equal to the vector (:::;¼s1Du(xs1);:::), if k = 1, and
to (:::;¡¼s2Du(xs2);:::); if k = 2.
c) Dh is the 3 £ 3 matrix of derivatives of equations11 (3); (4) and (5) with
respect to µ
2










h is a (CSh+Sh)£(CSh+2Sh+2) matrix of derivatives of the agent’s …rst
order conditions (equations (9) and (10)) with respect to the principal’s choice
variables, for k = 1;2. In particular, it has all zeros except for the derivative of









; the matrix of derivatives of the agent’s …rst
order conditions with respect to xsk
wh and ½sk
































are a (CSh+2Sh+2)£(C¡1) and a (CSh+Sh)£(C¡1); respectively, matrices of




; a (C ¡1)£C matrix, with a last column
of zeros, and I is the usual (C ¡ 1) square identity matrix.
The simple idea of the proof is to …rst perform some elementary operations
on rows and columns of (E.1) (that is, without a¤ecting its rank) and then to
observe that the obtained matrix has full row rank, as a consequence of a known
result. Namely, and for each h:
1. Using the full rank of Dh, clean12 the matrices Bk
h of their nonzero elements,
for k = 1;2:
2. Using the super-columns of (x1
wh;½1
h); and the fact that W1
h has full row
rank, clean C1
h of its nonzero elements. Keep in mind that µ
2
h = 1.
11All equation numbers refer to system (4.1), unless otherwise stated.
12By “clean” we mean: use an appropriate linear combination of columns (or rows) of the
given matrix and add it to the targeted matrix (or row(s), or column(s)), so that the result is
zero.
313. For k = 2; the matrix of derivatives of (7) and (8) with respect to zs2
h has




and the nonzero elements of C2





h has full rank. Hence we use it to clean the rows of ¡Á
02 in
M2
h (i.e. the derivatives of equation (2) with respect to ®s2
h ), and ¤2
h; a matrix of
nonzero derivatives in Pk
fh.
4. Because of Lemma 3.3, we can use M10
h to clean the matrix P1
fh:
Rearranging rows and columns, the transformed matrix (E.1) is shown to have





















wh) is the Hessian of the utility function of …rm (worker) if
e¤ort k = 2 is chosen. The above matrix has the same structure of the analogous
derivative for a standard exchange economy with completely incomplete …nancial
markets computed at a no trade equilibrium and therefore it has full row rank.
F. Proof of Lemma 4.4
In what follows, “Converges” means “converges (or so does a subsequence) to an
element which belongs to the set containing the sequence”. Consider a pair of




















n=1 Converges, say to µh; because it is contained in the compact set
[0;1]: For a similar reason, ftng1






bounded above by total resources and below by zero, all h. Since for any s we have
zskn
h = v(xskn
wh ); using the participation constraint and the boundary condition on
preferences it is easily seen that xkn









32because of (4:1:9) and the fact that pC = 1: fpng
1
n=1 Converges because ½shk does


















n=1 Converges. On the other hand, fxn
fhg is bounded above by total
resources and below away from the axes as a consequence of Lemmas 3:1 and
3:2; and the convergence of pn; then xn



























¡1 Ân - with obvious notation - and A(¼n) is a square matrix (recall that
Sh ¸ 2; all h) which has full rank along the sequence and in the limit and Ân
Converges.
According to the value of µ
2
h; either ´n
h ! 0 or ´n
h ! 0 (or both), while




h)ng = 0; all n, then 0 = limn!+1 minf´n
h;1¡(µ
2
h)ng = limn!+1 ´n:
Then, from (4:1:3); limn!+1 ´n = limn!+1 U (1;n)¡U (2;n); a converging limit,
with obvious notation. The same argument works in the remaining cases, and
completes the proof.
G. Proof of Lemma 4.5
The proof of existence by homotopy is carried through inductively. It is enough
to show that a homotopy exists between economies with S = 2 and S = 3. De…ne




++; where the two probability spaces satisfy the
assumptions of the paper in the case in which the number of the states is 2 and
3, respectively. Moreover, let
¼
k









De…ne the space of endogenous variables of an economy with S states as ¥S and
let dim¥S = n(S): Let -S be the space of exogenous variables of an economy
with S states (which for S = 3 includes both ¼h and ¼¤
h): Fix " 2 R++: Consider
the function
· : ¥
3 £ [0;1] ! R
n(3)
33de…ned:
a) by the left-hand side of equations (4.1.4) and (4.1.5), and of equations





h (t);while the corresponding equations for sh = 3 are given by
the left-hand side of the following system:
(1 ¡ t)(x3k














p(y3 + eh) + ¯
k
h¼3k
h (t) + ±
k
h(¢¼3






































= 0; all k;h (10)
(G.1)





































h ¡ ak + ak0o
























































Observe that for t = 0; we get the system de…ning equilibrium for the case of
two states of the world, plus some values related to a “fake” third state; as a
consequence, uniqueness and regularity of the test economy are not a¤ected by
the extension of the original function de…ning the equilibrium (the left-hand side
of (4.1)). For t = 1; we get the system de…ning the equilibrium for the case of
three states.
We claim that the set ·¡1 (0) is compact. As in Lemma 4.4, in what follows
“Converges” means “converges (or so does a subsequence) to an element which
belongs to the set containing the sequence”. Consider a pair (°;u) 2 -3 and















13Only in this proof, ¢¼h = ¼k
h ¡ ¼k0
h :
34We denote the limit of the sequence of a given variable by that variable with
an upper bar: Since t 2 [0;1]; ftng1
n=1 Converges. Although we would need to
consider three distinct cases, when t = 0;t = 1 or t 2 (0;1), the …rst two cases es-
sentially amount to repeating the proof of Lemma 4.4. We consider the remaining
case t 2 (0;1): [Note that we are omitting the other homotopy parameter, which
links (°;u) to (°¤;u¤): this part repeats the proof as in Lemma 4.4, and that is
why it is omitted.]
First, since t 2 (0;1); ¼kn







n=1 Converges, say to






is bounded above by equation (G:2:11) and below by zero. Observe that for






and we repeat the argument in Lemma 4.4, to
obtain Convergence of fxskn
wh g1
n=1. Similarly, for s = 1;2; ½sk
h
n Converges because















À 0: As for the other k; using equation (4.1.10) and
convergence of prices, we get Convergence of fxskn
wh g1
n=1for s = 1;2.






; we have that fzskn
h g1
n=1 Converges. Again





is bounded above by total resources and below by zero.



































>From the boundary condition xskn
fh ! xsk





n=1 Converges, for s = 1;2.
For s = 3; observe that fx3kn
wh g1
















0; and therefore Converges: Then we use (G.1.1) and (G.1.6) to get, for c =
1;:::;C;
0 = (1 ¡ t)(x
3kc






























Then if there exists c such that x3kcn
















n=1 Converges because of the price normalizationandof (4.1.1) and(G.1.1):
As for z3kn
h ; observe the following. If ±
kn




h > 0; from
equation (G.2.7); z3kn




h = 0; then from equation (4:1:2);
¯
kn
h converges. Now if z3kn






which contradicts equation (G:1:10): If z3kn





























with obvious notation - and A(¼n;¼¤n) has full rank along the sequence and in
the limit and Ân Converges. The remaining of the argument is identical to that
of Lemma 4.4.
H. Regularity results











































After substituting equations (H.2) for (H.1) in (4.1), we count one too many
equations. It is immediate now that we can essentially perturb this modi…ed
equation system as in (5.5), with the additional use of ¼sk
h ; and therefore conclude
that there is an open and dense subset of the parameters where the function F is





36Second, we remove the smoothness assumption. At any solution to (4.1): (i)
either ´h = 0 or µ
2
h = 0; all h; (ii) either ´h = 0 or µ
2




2h(:) = 0; all k;h; and never both.
It is su¢cient to consider one case, say (i), as all the others follow the same
way, and they are at most …nitely many combinations.
Suppose that ´h = 0 and µ
2
h = 0; some h: Then we can write system (4.1)
equivalently by substituting equation (4.1.4) and adding the equations µ
2
h = 0.
Let F0 = 0 represent this modi…ed system. We know we can perturb this modi…ed
system (this is trivially shown) and apply transversality to obtain a dense subset
of - where DF0
°;u has full rank. Hence for °;u in this dense subset, F0¡1
°;u (0) is a
manifold of negative dimension, or the empty set. To see this, simply notice that
in system (4:1) the number of equations and unknowns is equal, so that in the
modi…ed system F0
°;u = 0 there is one too many equations. Of course, ±
1
h = 0 and
f1
2h (:) > 0 in equilibrium for all economies, a standard result for principal-agents
models.
To show that conditions B) holds generically, we proceed as follows. We ap-
pend the equations °A0 = 0; with ° 2 RC¡1 and bTb = 1 to (4.1). Then, using a
perturbation of the gradient of the agent utility function which leaves unchanged
the direct and indirect utility function at equilibrium, we show that the augmented
version of (4.1) generically has no solution. A standard argument applies to show
the genericity of condition C).
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